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Abstract
In this paper we examine the mathematical relationship between growth
and distributional change on absolute (i.e. percentage point) changes
in FGT poverty measures assuming a log-normal income distribution,
which we argue to be a conceptually superior and more policy-relevant
measure than the much used ’regular’ growth elasticity of poverty re-
duction. We also test the empirical relationship of these semi-elasticities
of growth and distributional change on poverty and ﬁnd them to ex-
plain actual changes in poverty very well (in fact, much better than a
related study by Bourguignon (2003) that studied the growth elasticity
of poverty reduction). This is particularly the case when poverty depth
and severity is considered. Using our results helps in interpreting past
performance in poverty reduction and will allow a rapid and quite re-
liable prediction of the impact of growth and distributional change on
(absolute) poverty reduction across countries, taking heterogeneity in
country circumstances into account.
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11 Introduction
Prospects for poverty reduction in regions and on the global level, which are
critical for assessing progress towards meeting the ﬁrst Millennium Develop-
ment Goal, have so fare relied largely on simple extrapolations (e.g. Ravallion
and Chen, 2004). At the same time, we know quite a bit more about the
impact of growth and distributional change on poverty reduction and these
insights could be used to assess prospects for poverty reduction, depending
on particular country circumstances and growth scenarios. To provide such
assessments in a comparable manner for all countries, the relationship be-
tween growth, distributional change, and poverty reduction must be studied
in a way that allows for country heterogeneity but remains tractable.
Discussions about the sensitivity of the incidence of poverty to economic
growth have been going on for a number of years (e.g. World Bank, 2000;
Ravallion and Datt 1998; Adams, 2000; Ram, 2006; Bresson, 2006; Bour-
guignon, 2003). Although most studies clearly show that growth reduces
poverty, the size of this eﬀect is still debated (e.g. Dollar and Kraay, 2002).
Whereas diﬀerent studies estimated the growth elasticity of poverty reduc-
tion to be somewhere between -2.0 and -3.0 (Ravallion and Chen, 1997;
Bruno et al., 1998; World Bank 2000) a well known study by Bhalla (2002)
estimated it to be about -5.0, meaning that a 1 percent increase in mean
income reduces the poverty headcount by 5 percent.1
A related question concerns the impact of distributional change on poverty.
While also here there has been some empirical work (e.g. reviewed in World
Bank 2000 and Bourguignon, 2003), a purely data-driven approaches have
usually yielded mixed and strongly varying estimates and are often only able
to explain a small portion of the actual change in poverty. In particular, it
has become increasingly clear that both the impact of growth and distribu-
1See also Ram (2006) for a discussion of the diﬀerent estimates and their apparent
inconsistencies.
2tional change on poverty will depend on a number of factors, including the
location of the poverty line and the initial level of inequality.
From an analytical point of view this is not very surprising, since an
identity links changes in mean income, changes in the income distribution
and reductions in poverty. This identity results in a non-linear relationship
between economic growth and headcount poverty as well as between distri-
butional changes and headcount poverty 2. Although the identity has been
known for quite a while, only a small number of studies has taken account
of it, namely Ravallion and Huppi (1991), Datt and Ravallion (1992), Kak-
wani (1993) and Bourguignon (2003). All these studies are limited to the
country level with the only exception being Bourguignon (2003). This is due
to the fact that one needs to know the complete distribution of incomes on
the household level. Bourguignon (2003) circumvents this problem by as-
suming that incomes are lognormally distributed and therefore the complete
distribution of incomes is known as long as information on mean income
and the Gini coeﬃcient is available. With this simplifying assumption3 one
can mathematically determine the poverty elasticity to growth and distribu-
tional change and it will depend on initial inequality, as well as the location
of the poverty line in relation to mean incomes. It turns out that this sim-
pliﬁcation ﬁts the data extremely well (see Bourguignon, 2003) and this is
also supported by our calculations using a similar (and partially overlap-
ping) dataset used by Adams (2004) which is also based on the World Bank
poverty monitoring database. Thus the assumption of log-normality achieves
the goal of providing a simple, yet powerful tool to assess and project poverty
2In the following it will be shown that the identity can be used to calculate the inﬂuence
of income and distribution changes on other poverty measures than the headcount poverty
ratio as for example the FGT poverty measures.
3Bresson (2006) questions this simplifying assumption. Using a large sample of obser-
vations, he ﬁnds that some 2 parameter distributions might provide a better ﬁt for the
data, although there is not a single one that performs best overall. That study does not
control, however, for the determinants of the growth elasticity considered here. Also, the
question of how well one can predict poverty reduction using the lognormal assumption is
largely an empirical issue that is directly addressed below.
3reduction depending on country circumstances.
Using the same assumption as Bourguignon (2003) we propose an alter-
native measure to calculate the eﬀects of income growth and distributional
changes on poverty. Instead of studying the determinants of the percent-
age change in poverty (and the associated poverty elasticity of growth and
distributional change), we propose to study the percentage point change in
poverty (and the associated poverty semi-elasticity of growth and distribu-
tional change). We argue that there are two distinct advantages to study
absolute rather than proportionate poverty reduction. The ﬁrst set of argu-
ments is conceptual. They relate to the fact that policy-makers are likely to
be more interested in the percentage point changes in poverty in their coun-
try rather than percent changes4. Also, when the poverty incidence becomes
small, large percentage changes in poverty incidence are easily achieved and
it seems diﬃcult to treat poverty reduction from an incidence of 2 to 1 per-
cent in the same manner as poverty reduction from an incidence of 80 to
40%. Lastly, as discussed further below, it can be shown that in growing
countries (and a constant real absolute poverty line such as the international
dollar-a-day poverty line), the growth elasticity of poverty reduction will
keep increasing, giving the misleading impression of growth not only being
’good for the poor’, but becoming ever better for them over time.5
4One may argue that MDG1 is, at the global level, about percentage changes in poverty
(i.e. a 50% reduction in poverty). Since this is a non-marginal change, one cannot,
however, directly use the growth elasticity of poverty reduction to deduce the growth
requirements with any reliability. Moreover, since progress has been and will continue
to be uneven between countries, it will be much easier to understand progress if one
reformulated the goal as an absolute reduction in the poverty incidence from 29% to
14.5% and then consider what absolute poverty reduction where would contribute by how
much to this goal. In the case of MDG1, if interpreted at the global level, one would also
have to consider where poverty incidence has fallen, particularly is it has fallen in the
countries where the absolute number of poor is very large which depends not only on the
poverty rate but also on population size.
5In this context, it is interesting to note that, as argued by Ram (2006), many forward-
looking assessments of poverty reduction appear to imply a falling growth elasticity of
poverty reduction in future. This could only be the case if future growth was accompanied
by increasing inequality as it has been in a growing number of countries recently. Without
knowing the details of these projections, it is hard to verify this conjecture.
4The second set of arguments is empirical. Proportionate poverty changes
cannot be calculated when the poverty incidence was 0 in at the start or end
of the spell. More seriously, proportionate poverty changes can be very large
when the poverty incidence is small. For example, a change from 2 to 1
per cent headcount is a 50% reduction. As the elasticity formulas are for
marginal changes, they are not appropriately applied to situations where the
poverty changes are very large. For these reasons, in empirical assessments
of the growth elasticity (e.g. Bourguignon, 2003; Adams, 2004; Kraay, 2006),
these observations with low (or zero) poverty incidence are usually simply
dropped and one cannot therefore say much about the poverty-growth nexus
in these situations. When applied to the $ a day poverty line, this usually
means that most observations from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as
well as some from the Middle East and North Africa, are excluded from
consideration. Moreover, as we show below, the assumption of lognormality
is empirically much less reliable when trying to estimate the determinants of
the growth elasticity of poverty reduction, particularly when poverty depth
and severity is considered.
In contrast, the lognormal assumption appears to work much better when
estimating the impact of growth and distributional change on absolute (i.e.
percentage point) poverty reductions. One does not need to make arbitrary
assumptions about excluding data from countries with low poverty incidence.
Also, such an empirical analysis will place more weight on countries with high
poverty incidence which is desirable as these countries are the main concern
of the international poverty reduction eﬀort.
Our work is also related to a second literature which measures the actual
historical contribution of growth and inequality change on poverty reduc-
tion. Starting with the decomposition work by Datt and Ravallion (1992),
a recent contribution is by Kraay (2006) who examines to what extent past
poverty reduction in the world (using the $ a day criterion) was due to a
5growth eﬀect, a distribution eﬀect, or an eﬀect measuring diﬀerences in the
impact of growth on poverty reduction. That paper found that in the longer
term, poverty reduction was mostly a result of growth rather than distribu-
tional change, although that ﬁnding is sensitive to the length of the spell
and the type of poverty measure. As that paper addresses a related but
diﬀerent question (the actual decomposed roles of growth and distributional
change on poverty reduction, rather than an assessment of the respective
elasticities), our analysis here should be seen as complementary. But since
the study be Kraay also examines proportionate poverty reduction, it runs
into similar problems as the growth elasticity papers and therefore also dis-
cards observations where poverty incidence was zero or low (below 2%) in
the initial or ﬁnal period. Thus such decompositions could also be usefully
enriched when one considered absolute poverty reduction where such data
discards would not be required.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂy review the math-
ematical relationships between growth, distributional change, and poverty
reduction under the log-normal assumption, using both the proportionate as
well as the absolute change in poverty. In section 3 we consider the relative
merits of the elasticity versus the semi-elasticity in more detail. In section
4, we move to the data and study to what extent we are able to explain past
absolute and relative poverty reduction with the log-normal assumption. In
the last section we conclude and assess prospects for poverty reduction in dif-
ferent countries of the world, based on the existing income and distribution
patterns.
2 The Inﬂuence of Income and Distribution Changes
on Poverty Measures
As already mentioned by Bourguignon (2003), Datt and Ravallion (1992)
and others, poverty reductions are either due to increases in mean income or
6changes in the distribution of relative incomes. Knowing this any change in
headcount poverty can be decomposed into a) a "growth eﬀect" that is the
result of a proportional change in all incomes that leaves the distribution of
relative incomes unaﬀected and b) a "distributional eﬀect" that is only due
to a change in the distribution of relative incomes leaving the mean income
constant. These two eﬀects are shown in Fig. 1 (from Bourguignon, 2003).
Figure 1
Decomposition of change in distribution and poverty into growth and distributional eﬀects
Source: Bourguignon (2003).
Formally the change in headcount poverty can be explained by the fol-
lowing decomposition identity:

























where Ht refers to the headcount poverty measure and F() refers to the
cumulative distribution function of an actual income distribution. The ﬁrst
term refers to the growth eﬀect while the second one to the distribution eﬀect.
Using the empirically plausible assumption proposed by Bourguignon (2003)
7that incomes are lognormally distributed, we no longer need to know the
total distribution of individual incomes to calculate headcount poverty. The
only information necessary is the mean income yt, the constant international
poverty line z (e.g. the $1 a day criterion) and the standard deviation of the
lognormal distribution :










wherein ¦ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.
The standard deviation of the lognormal distribution can be calculated from











Besides the headcount poverty ratio at a certain point in time, relative
and absolute changes in poverty due to "growth eﬀects" and "distributional
eﬀects" can be generated on the basis of changes in mean income and changes
in the Gini coeﬃcient. When considering relative changes in the headcount


















where ¸ is the hazard rate, which is the ratio of density function to the
cumulative density function of the standard normal.
In contrast to Bourguignon, our focus will be on absolute (i.e. percent-
age point) changes in the headcount poverty ratio and therefore on semi-
elasticities. As will be argued below this is a less misleading measure than



































where ¼ is the density function of the standard normal.
When combined with the growth rate and the percentage change in
the standard deviation, respectively these theoretical values of the semi-
elasticities will identify the percentage point changes in the headcount poverty
ratio either due to growth in mean income (5) or due to changes in the dis-
tribution of relative incomes (6) depending on the level of development and
the existing distribution of incomes.
As mentioned before, it is also possible to calculate the elasticities and
semi-elasticities for the other FGT-measures. According to formulas derived
by Kakwani (1993) the elasticity ´P® of FGT-measure P® with respect to










The elasticity ²P® of a FGT-measure with respect to a change in the dis-
tribution leaving the mean income unaﬀected can be denoted by the following
equation




In combination with the assumption of lognormally distributed incomes
this means that the elasticity of the poverty gap with respect to changes in




6It should be noted that formula (9) diﬀers from the formula cited by Bourguignon

















Using the formulas derived by Kakwani (1993) we can also generate values




y ¤ P® = ¡®[P®¡1 ¡ P®] (10)
and with respect to changes in distribution
·P®




In tables A1-A4 in the appendix as well as Table 7 below, we have used
these results to calculate elasticities and semi-elasticities with respect to
growth and distributional change depending on initial inequality and the
location of the poverty line with respect to mean income to illustrate the
impact of the diﬀerent formulas. These tables will be discussed in more
detail below.
3 Growth Elasticity versus Semi-Elasticity
Economists usually tend to use elasticities to measure the inﬂuence of in-
come/consumption growth on poverty changes. Although this information
is clearly of some relevance it is actually texitabsolute changes in poverty
measures and therefore semi-elasticities that policy makers at the national
and international level are interested in. The number of persons leaving or
entering poverty measured as a percentage of the total population is clearly
of more interest than the same amount measured as a percentage of the poor.
Stated diﬀerently the reduction of the percentage of the population that is
living below the poverty line by 10 percentage points is clearly a lot. But
the reduction of headcount poverty by 10% can be a lot, if the poverty rate
10is currently around 60%, but if it is only at 6% it is not really that much
(only another 0.6% of the population are leaving poverty).
Moreover, as shown in the formulas above and in Table A1 in the ap-
pendix, the growth elasticity of poverty reduction is highly sensitive to the
location of the poverty line relative to mean incomes. The higher mean
income in a country is (relative to an international absolute poverty line),
the larger the growth elasticity; as shown in Table A1, the eﬀects are quite
large. Middle-income countries will have much larger elasticities and regional
comparisons of elasticities that have been regularly undertaken (e.g. Adams,
2004) will be biased in this sense. There is a further problem when comparing
elasticities over time. Continued per capita growth in developing countries
will lead to an increase in the distance between the absolute poverty line and
mean incomes. Not only will such growth reduce absolute poverty, but as
clear from the formulas above, the growth elasticity of poverty reduction will
increase as well. This may lead policy makers to the conclusion that policies
that were implemented in times with lower poverty rates were more success-
ful in poverty reduction than policies that were implement during times of
very high poverty rates, although these changes are purely a consequence of
the way elasticities are calculated. To give an easy imaginary example, future
economists might ﬁnd that growth elasticities between 1980 and 2000 were
a lot lower than in the following two decades. Therefore they might falsely
come to the conclusion that the growth enhancing policies implemented in
the last two decades were less successful than growth policies that are to be
implemented in the future. In contrast, the semi-elasticity formulation will
not have an in-built increase in the poverty impact of growth (see Table 7
below). In fact, the opposite occurs. As countries grow richer, the ability of
growth to achieve the same absolute poverty reduction becomes increasingly
smaller.7
7While this will also bias assessments of the poverty impact of growth, this time in
the opposite direction, this bias is arguably less problematic than the one of persistent
11From an empirical point of view, there are further advantages to esti-
mating the determinants of absolute rather than proportionate changes in
poverty. In estimating the determinants of proportionate changes in welfare,
all studies using proportionate changes in poverty must discard observations
where poverty spells started or ended with a headcount of 0. In addition,
most poverty spells with low initial or ﬁnal poverty incidence are omitted as
they generate very large proportionate changes and tend to drive and dis-
tort empirical assessments. For example, Bourguignon states that he had to
’eliminate all spells where the percentage change in poverty headcount was
abnormally large in relative value’ (Bourguignon 2003: 15). Adams (2004)
and Kraay (2006) also discarded such spells for the same reason. Using the
semi-elasticity, we can include all observations that are available and are not
bound by such an arbitrary decision; thus we can consider the impact of
growth and distributional change on poverty reduction in cases of high or
low poverty incidence. In our case we can increase the number of growth
spells from 102 to 125 in our empirical assessments. In particular, we are
able to include many growth spells from Eastern Europe and Central Asia
as well as the Middle East and North Africa which would otherwise be un-
derrepresented in the dataset.
Lastly, when using semi-elasticities, the assumption of lognormality is
leading to much more precise results, particularly when considering poverty
measures like poverty gap and squared poverty gap. Thus this distributional
assumption appears to be work better when studying absolute rather than
proportionate poverty changes.
increase in the poverty impact of growth. In actual fact, it may be the case that poverty
reduction becomes increasingly harder when the poverty incidence is reduced to very levels
as these groups are hard to reach and hard to include in growth-processes. The declining
semi-elasticity would capture this insight.
124 Empirical Results
In the empirical section we test our ability to explain the determinants of
absolute and proportionate poverty change using the above insights and for-
mulas, and apply them to the World Bank’s $ a day poverty line. We do
this using a slightly diﬀerent data-set than Bourguignon (2003) which is an
updated version of the World Bank Poverty Monitoring data set also used by
Adams (2004). To make our results easily comparable with those of Bour-
guignon we have used the same set of regressions and given them the same
names. In Tab. 1 - 6 our ﬁrst regression is the naïve model that tries to
explain changes in poverty measures by changes in mean incomes only. In
all cases growth clearly has a signiﬁcant poverty reducing eﬀect but only a
relatively small part of the variation in poverty changes can be explained by
a linear inﬂuence of mean income growth. The second regression in Tab. 1 -
6 is the so called standard model that also takes changes in the distribution
of incomes (i.e. variations in the Gini coeﬃcient) into consideration and












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15As shown in the formulas above, both changes in mean incomes as well as
changes in distribution have a non-constant inﬂuence on changes in poverty
measures. As the formulas show, the size of the eﬀects depends on the po-
sition of the poverty line relative to mean income and on initial inequality.
This non-linear inﬂuence of growth in mean incomes is considered by inter-
acting growth with the initial poverty-line/mean-income ratio and the initial
Gini coeﬃcient (Improved Standard Model 1). By interacting changes in the
Gini coeﬃcient with the same two factors we also take account of the non-
linear inﬂuence of changes in the distribution of incomes (Improved Standard
Model 2). When taking these non-linear inﬂuences of growth and distribu-
tion changes into consideration we are able to explain more than 70% of the
variation in absolute changes in headcount poverty (Table 1) and about 50%
of the variation in relative changes in headcount poverty (Table 2). This is a
considerably improvement. The greater explanatory power of the regressions
of the absolute poverty change is also true if we restricted the data set to
the 102 observations used in the relative regression.
While in these ﬁrst four regressions no assumptions are made on how in-
come growth interacts with the distance of the poverty line to mean income
and the initial degree of inequality the ﬁfth regression (Identity Model 1)
assumes a joint eﬀect of these three variables according to the theoretical
(semi-)elasticity mentioned in section 2. The last regression model (Iden-
tity Model 2) further assumes a joint eﬀect of a change in the distribution,
the development level and the initial degree of inequality according to the
theoretical (semi-)elasticity. As seen in Tables 1 and 2 the assumption of a
lognormal distribution ﬁts the data very well. Multiplying growth in mean
incomes with the respective theoretical value for the (semi-)elasticity and
multiplying a change in the distribution of incomes with its respective the-
oretical value for the (semi-)elasticity can explain in both cases about 70%
16of the variation in absolute/relative changes in headcount poverty rates.8
Whereas the results for headcount poverty are very similar between the
last regressions in Tables 1 and 2, the goodness of ﬁt is a lot better when
looking at absolute changes in poverty gap and squared poverty gap and
therefore when semi-elasticities are considered (Tables 3 and 5). The R2
values in Tables 4 and 6, where relative changes in poverty gap and squared
poverty gap are considered, respectively, are quite modest, suggesting that
the lognormal assumption is no longer as suitable because the explanatory
power of the Identity Models are in both cases considerably smaller than
those of the Improved Standard Models. The likely reason for the poor
ﬁt when considering depth and distribution-sensitive poverty measures is
related to the increasing importance of the left tail of the distribution in
countries with low poverty incidence who in turn are very inﬂuential due to
the large proportionate poverty changes observed.9 It is quite likely that
these far left tails of the distribution are particularly prone to measurement
error. Or alternatively, the assumption of log-normality is probably partic-
ularly problematic the more one moves into the left tail of the distribution.
In contrast, it is very encouraging to see that we are able to explain changes
in the absolute poverty gap and poverty severity very well still with the log-
normal assumption. Thus our simplifying assumption of log-normality works
particularly well when trying to explain absolute changes in poverty. This
much better ﬁt implies that the lognormal assumption is quite suitable when
studying absolute changes in poverty headcount, depth and severity. This is
due to the fact that these absolute poverty changes are largest in countries
with high poverty incidence and in these countries the depth and severity
8Please note that, according to the formulas, it would not be necessary to include a
constant in regressions 6 and 7. As it turns out the constant is always substantively very
close to 0, although sometimes statistically diﬀerent from it.
9By reducing the least squares deviations of the dependent variable from the regression
line, OLS is particularly inﬂuenced by observations that have particularly high or low val-
ues. When the dependent variable is proportionate poverty change, most such particularly
high or low observations will be from countries with small initial poverty incidence.
17of poverty is well approximated with the lognormal assumption. It is also
reassuring to know that our empirical results include all observations and
are not based on arbitrary selection rules, but are particularly inﬂuenced by
observations with large poverty incidence which are the main countries of





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22The preceding empirical results are very encouraging and allow us to
generate tables for policy makers that could give a clear impression as to
what percent point reduction in headcount poverty a 1% growth in mean
incomes (assuming no change in income distribution) yields depending on
the initial Gini coeﬃcient and the level of development (Table 7). As the
table shows, the highest growth semi-elasticity of poverty occurs in the Table
when the Gini is 0.2 and the poverty line is at 90% of mean income. Thus a
particularly poor country with a very equal income distribution can expect
absolute large poverty reduction through (distribution-neutral) growth. In
fact, 1 % growth will yield more than a one percentage point reduction in
poverty.10
Table 7
Poverty/Growth semi-elasticity as a function of mean income and income inequality
(assumption: zero growth of mean income)
Poverty line as a proportion of mean income
Gini 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
0.20 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.066 0.239 0.512 0.798 1.009 1.106 1.096
0.25 0.000 0.003 0.044 0.173 0.374 0.586 0.754 0.854 0.885 0.863
0.30 0.000 0.020 0.112 0.271 0.444 0.587 0.681 0.725 0.730 0.705
0.35 0.003 0.057 0.185 0.337 0.466 0.555 0.605 0.621 0.614 0.590
0.40 0.013 0.107 0.245 0.370 0.459 0.511 0.535 0.537 0.524 0.502
0.45 0.033 0.158 0.286 0.379 0.436 0.464 0.472 0.466 0.451 0.432
0.50 0.064 0.201 0.307 0.372 0.405 0.418 0.416 0.406 0.391 0.373
0.55 0.100 0.233 0.313 0.354 0.371 0.032 0.366 0.354 0.340 0.324
0.60 0.137 0.252 0.307 0.330 0.335 0.331 0.321 0.308 0.295 0.281
0.65 0.168 0.258 0.293 0.302 0.299 0.291 0.280 0.267 0.255 0.243
0.70 0.192 0.255 0.271 0.271 0.263 0.253 0.241 0.230 0.219 0.208
Similar easily interpretable tables can also be generated for changes in
10One may wonder why the semi-elasticity is smaller when the poverty line is equal to
mean incomes. This is related to the fact that in a lognormal distribution, mean and mode
are not at the same place. The largest impact will occur at the mode which is to the left
of the mean in a lognormal distribution.
23the distribution of incomes (see appendix table A4) as well as for other
FGT-measures. From this table one can see that the impact of distributional
change on absolute (percentage point) poverty reduction is particularly large
for countries where the poverty line is about 60-70% of mean incomes and
is larger the more equal the distribution. For poorer countries, the pay-oﬀ
shrinks considerably as a reduction in inequality will not only push a lower
number of people above the poverty line, but also push an increasing number
of people from the right half of the distribution below the poverty line.
These tables contrast sharply with tables on the growth and distribution
elasticity shown in Tables A2 and A3 which show uniformly that growth and
inequality reduction will always be largest in countries where mean incomes
are much higher than the poverty line and inequality is low.
Table 8 shows the elasticities and semi-elasticities for a number of indi-
vidual countries to illustrate the diﬀerence with concrete country examples.
When we study elasticities, by far the largest growth elasticities of poverty
reduction are found in the transition countries where poverty incidence is
very low. Conversely, the elasticities are lowest in Africa as well as India and
rural China. In each case, this is largely due to the low mean incomes in these
countries and regions, sometimes exacerbated by relatively high inequality.
Also the distribution elasticities are much larger in transition countries and
particularly low in poor African countries with relatively high inequality.
In contrast, the highest growth semi-elasticities are found in Bangladesh,
Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and rural China. These are all coun-
tries where income inequality is relatively low and mean incomes are quite
close to the poverty line (of $ 365 a year). This not only generates a totally
diﬀerent picture on the impact of growth on poverty than suggested by the
elasticities but it also puts into perspective recent debates about past poverty
reduction performance in these countries. The large absolute poverty reduc-
tion achieved in India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and rural China not
24only was a result of high, and in of these countries rather equitable, growth
but it all occurred in situations where growth was having a particularly large
impact on poverty reduction.11 The results also suggest that Ethiopia could
produce a similar poverty reduction feat if it was able to improve its growth
performance.
Conversely, the countries with low elasticities include particularly the
transition countries with little further scope for poverty reduction (such as
the Slovak Republic and Latvia) as well as Brazil and urban China, where
poverty is already quite low and high inequality (in the case of Brazil par-
ticularly) is making further absolute poverty reduction very diﬃcult.
The highest distribution semi-elasticities are found in Indonesia, Lithua-
nia, Turkmenistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and rural China. The list is simi-
lar but shows that the pay-oﬀ to distributional change in terms of absolute
poverty reduction is relatively larger in richer and quite equal countries such
as Indonesia or Turkmenistan. Conversely, distributional change will have a
relatively low pay-oﬀ in the transition countries with very low poverty inci-
dence, but also in Zambia and Niger where the ratio of the poverty line to
mean incomes is close to 1 or above 1, thus lowering the impact of distri-
butional change on poverty. As these particular countries grow, we would,
according to the results in Table A4, expect the eﬀect of distributional change
on absolute poverty to ﬁrst increase and then decrease with further economic
growth.
11For debates about poverty reduction in these countries, see for example, Bhalla 2002;












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To summarize our results we ﬁnd generally strong support for the assumption
of lognormally distributed incomes when studying the growth-inequality-
poverty nexus. At the same time, we ﬁnd that this assumption is particularly
accurate when studying absolute poverty reduction.
The use of semi-elasticities instead of elasticities has considerable con-
ceptual advantages. By looking at absolute changes (i.e. percentage point
changes) in headcount poverty, poverty gap and squared poverty gap we can
study the poverty reduction experience of a wider set of countries, obviating
the need for arbitrary data trimming. The generation of semi-elasticities
needs no additional information and can be achieved by simple modiﬁca-
tions of the formulas derived in Kakwani (1993). The use of semi-elasticities
leads to high explanatory power of past poverty reduction even for distribu-
tionally sensitive measures such as the poverty gap and the squared poverty
gap. With our measure we come to drastically diﬀerent interpretations of
the prospects for poverty reduction in the future as well as on explaining the
record of poverty reduction in diﬀerent countries.
We should end the paper with two important caveats. While it is concep-
tually relatively straight-forward to assess the impact of distribution-neutral
growth on absolute and proportionate poverty reduction, it is conceptually
less clear how to interpret our results of distributional change on poverty
reduction. In these cases, we consider proportionate changes in the Gini
coeﬃcient while maintaining the lognormal assumption. This is a rather ab-
stract way to model distributional change and in principle, there are inﬁnite
ways such distributional change could come about. This should be borne in
mind when interpreting the ﬁndings.
Moreover, in all the analysis here (following the literature to which we
are contributing), we are assuming that growth and distributional change
can be separated and separately assessed in their impact on poverty. While
27this is true in an ex post accounting sense, it is clear from a policy perspec-
tive, the two issues are not easily separable as most policies one can think of
will typically have simultaneous eﬀects on growth and on distribution.12 To
what extent diﬀerent policies aﬀect growth and/or distribution has not been
analyzed here. All we are did here was to provide policy-makers with ways to
determine the poverty impact of diﬀerent growth and distributional change
scenarios on poverty reduction, depending on initial inequality and the loca-
tion of the poverty line; we believe that this is a useful way to analyze past
poverty reduction, project future poverty reduction, and consider diﬀerent
growth/distribution scenarios and their impact on poverty. The harder ques-
tion concerning the type of policies that will deliver such growth-distribution
scenarios remains an area of active research (e.g. Grimm et al., 2007; Besley
and Cord, 2007; Kraay, 2006).
12In principle, one can of course use our approach here to combine growth and distri-
butional eﬀects of a policy by considering their combined eﬀect on poverty.
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306 Appendix
Table A1
Poverty/Growth elasticity as a function of mean income and income inequality
(assumption: no change in distribution)
Poverty line as a proportion of mean income
Gini 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
0.20 17.864 12.629 9.635 7.570 6.025 4.817 3.852 3.071 2.435 1.919
0.25 11.262 8.004 6.156 4.892 3.952 3.223 2.640 2.169 1.783 1.465
0.30 7.672 5.484 4.253 3.416 2.798 2.319 1.938 1.628 1.373 1.161
0.35 5.505 3.958 3.095 2.511 2.082 1.750 1.485 1.270 1.092 0.944
0.40 4.095 2.962 2.334 1.912 1.602 1.363 1.172 1.017 0.888 0.779
0.45 3.126 2.274 1.806 1.492 1.262 1.085 0.943 0.828 0.731 0.650
0.50 2.430 1.778 1.422 1.184 1.010 0.876 0.769 0.681 0.608 0.546
0.55 1.912 1.407 1.132 0.950 0.817 0.033 0.632 0.564 0.508 0.460
0.60 1.515 1.121 0.908 0.767 0.664 0.584 0.521 0.469 0.425 0.388
0.65 1.203 0.895 0.729 0.619 0.540 0.478 0.429 0.388 0.354 0.325
0.70 0.953 0.712 0.583 0.498 0.437 0.389 0.351 0.320 0.293 0.271
Table A2
Poverty/Distribution change elasticity as a function of mean income and income inequality
(assumption: no change in mean incomes)
Poverty line as a proportion of mean income
Gini 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
0.20 118.003 58.991 34.102 20.715 12.734 7.731 4.525 2.462 1.152 0.344
0.25 60.082 30.389 17.835 11.049 6.970 4.379 2.685 1.563 0.818 0.330
0.30 34.510 17.691 10.555 6.675 4.322 2.806 1.796 1.110 0.640 0.316
0.35 21.519 11.197 6.799 4.391 2.917 1.954 1.302 0.849 0.530 0.303
0.40 14.233 7.527 4.655 3.071 2.091 1.444 0.998 0.683 0.455 0.289
0.45 9.835 5.291 3.335 2.247 1.568 1.114 0.797 0.568 0.400 0.275
0.50 7.024 3.848 2.472 1.702 1.216 0.887 0.654 0.484 0.357 0.261
0.55 5.142 2.871 1.881 1.322 0.966 -0.038 0.548 0.419 0.322 0.246
0.60 3.833 2.183 1.459 1.046 0.781 0.598 0.466 0.367 0.291 0.231
0.65 2.892 1.681 1.146 0.839 0.640 0.501 0.399 0.322 0.262 0.215
0.70 2.196 1.304 0.907 0.677 0.527 0.421 0.343 0.283 0.236 0.199
31Table A3
Theoretical values of headcount poverty as a function of mean income and income inequality
Poverty line as a proportion of mean income
Gini 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
0.20 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.87 3.96 10.63 20.71 32.86 45.43 57.11
0.25 0.00 0.04 0.72 3.53 9.46 18.19 28.56 39.36 49.66 58.91
0.30 0.00 0.37 2.64 7.94 15.88 25.30 35.12 44.55 53.15 60.74
0.35 0.05 1.44 5.99 13.41 22.38 31.73 40.71 48.93 56.22 62.58
0.40 0.31 3.60 10.52 19.36 28.64 37.52 45.62 52.79 59.05 64.46
0.45 1.07 6.93 15.83 25.42 34.56 42.80 50.03 56.31 61.72 66.37
0.50 2.64 11.31 21.62 31.43 40.14 47.66 54.10 59.60 64.30 68.33
0.55 5.25 16.54 27.67 37.31 45.44 98.65 57.94 62.75 66.84 70.34
0.60 9.02 22.45 33.85 43.06 50.51 56.59 61.62 65.82 69.38 72.41
0.65 13.98 28.88 40.13 48.71 55.43 60.81 65.21 68.86 71.94 74.56
0.70 20.10 35.75 46.47 54.29 60.26 64.96 68.78 71.93 74.57 76.82
Table A4
Poverty/Distribution change semi-elasticity as a function of mean income and inequality
(assumption: zero growth of mean income)
Poverty line as a proportion of mean income
Gini 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
0.20 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.180 0.504 0.822 0.937 0.809 0.523 0.196
0.25 0.000 0.012 0.129 0.390 0.659 0.796 0.767 0.615 0.406 0.194
0.30 0.001 0.065 0.278 0.530 0.686 0.710 0.631 0.495 0.340 0.192
0.35 0.012 0.161 0.407 0.589 0.653 0.620 0.530 0.415 0.298 0.189
0.40 0.045 0.271 0.490 0.595 0.599 0.542 0.455 0.360 0.269 0.186
0.45 0.105 0.367 0.528 0.571 0.542 0.477 0.399 0.320 0.247 0.182
0.50 0.185 0.435 0.534 0.535 0.488 0.423 0.354 0.289 0.230 0.178
0.55 0.270 0.475 0.520 0.493 0.439 0.037 0.318 0.263 0.215 0.173
0.60 0.346 0.490 0.494 0.451 0.395 0.339 0.287 0.241 0.202 0.167
0.65 0.404 0.486 0.460 0.409 0.354 0.304 0.260 0.222 0.189 0.160
0.70 0.441 0.466 0.421 0.367 0.317 0.273 0.236 0.204 0.176 0.152
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